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The Politics of Pollution,
Another Fallout of Acid Rain
CYNTHIA L. ANDERSON*

ABSTRACT- The threat of acid rain is a side effect of the switch to coal as a major fuel for producing
energy in the United States. Despite the existence of technology to reduce the pollutants that cause
acid rain, the emissions of sulfur and nitric oxides are likely to increase because among several factors
of political resistance to regulatory controls . The politics of pollution pit energy production and
economic growth against environmental quality. Developing a regulatory policy is further complicated
by the difficulty of isolating specific environmental effects attributable to acid rain apart from natural
causes within the ecosystem. The question facing policy makers is whether the politics of pollution
and the inherent difficulties of environmental research can be overcome before protecting the environfrom the effects of acid rain is no longer an option.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has warned that America may be facing a most serious environmental challenge. Since the increase in the acidity of
precipitation in North America was first identified in the
1960's by Gene E. Likens of Cornell University, researchers
in Canada and the United States have become increasingly
concerned over the problem of acid rain.
Acid rain originates from the combustion of organic fuels
and the attendant discharge of sulfur and nitrogen oxides
into the atmosphere. The principal sources of these oxides
are emissions from power generation , smelting processes,
and transportation equipment. Released generally from tall
smokestacks, these pollutants travel several hundred kilometers per day across state and national borders through a
process called long-range transport of air pollutants. During
transport, the sulfur and nitric oxides can be converted
through oxidation into sulfuric and nitric acids. While the
oxidation mechanism is not totally understood, EPA data
notes that the reaction can be influenced by factors such as
the intensity of sunlight, the presence of heavy metals, and
the concentration of ammonia in the air (EPA, 1979). Some
oxides react with airborne moisture to produce acidic contaminants in rain and snow through a process known as wet
deposition. Dry deposition occurs when gases are absorbed
directly by plants or when particles containing sulfates or
nitrates fall to the ground. Both wet and dry deposition are
considered part of the phenomena termed acid rain (Lyons ,
1979).
Acidity or alkalinity of precipitation is measured on a
logarithmic pH scale ranging from 0 to 14. The lower values
indicate acidic solutions and higher values indicate basic
solutions. A solution with pH of 7 is neutral. A change of
one unit on the pH scale, from 5.6 to 4.6 , for example, indicates a ten-fold change in acidity. Pure rain is slightly
acidic with a pH reading of 5.6 as the result of the reaction of
atmospheric carbon dioxide with water to form carbonic acid .
The average acidic rainfall in the eastern United States is 25
to 50 times more acidic than unpolluted rainfall (Dumanoski,
1980). It has been shown that when the buffering capacity

of a lake is exhausted, it can become increasingly acidic at a
rapid rate. The reproductive capacity of fish is placed under
stress when a lake acidifies to a pH of 5 and the fish cannot
survive at values lower than pH 4.5 (Schofield, 1980).
Already more than 200 lakes in the Adirondack mountains
are reported to have "died" because they are too acidic to
support any of the usual fish and flora. There are indications
that lakes in areas of similar geological composition such as
Ontario and the Boundary Waters canoe Area of northern
Minnesota are likely to be threatened within the next too
decades (Gorham, 1980). In addition to confirmed data on
the effects of increased acidity on aquatic life, there is preliminary evidence linking acid precipitation to reduced agricultural production, hazy air, mineral-depleted soils, respiratory ailments, and the accelerated decomposition of
stone (Speth, 1980).
Recognizing the destructive capability of acid rain, the
1979-80 Minnesota Legislature stated that "the failure to
act promptly to mitigate this danger through judicious regulatory policies will result in irreparable degradation of the
environment (House File 490)." With respect to development of regulatory policies to control acid rain, this paper
seeks to assess existing options under current law, including
an analysis of the Clean Air Act and political resistance to
regulation.
Nature and Effect of the Federal law

The Clean Air Act is the basic federal law for controlling
the emission of adverse pollutants into the air.
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
(Section 108 of the Clean Air Act) set the maximum allowable ambient concentrations for pollutants throughout specified time periods. NAAQS are subdivided into primary
standards which address impacts on human health , and
secondary standards which take into account other values
besides health. Examples of these other values, referred to
as public welfare values, include environmental aesthetics
and the effects of pollutants on plants and wildlife. The
target time for state-by-state compliance with primary
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standards was set as 1982. No fixed date has been set for
compliance with the secondary standards (Speth, 1980).
While the air quality standards were set on a national basis,
implementation has b,een left up to the states. The Clean
Air Act requires each state to prepare a State Implementation
Plan or SIP designed to meet the standards for that area as
promulgated by the EPA (Science, 1979). Under the SIP
concept, a power plant has a number of options for removing
air pollutants. These include burning low-sulfur coal, installing scrubbers in smokestacks, using coal with much of
the sulfur removed (Speth, 1980), or switching to solventrefined coal (Science, 1979). These approaches all address
the need for economic growth as well as environmental protection but they are more expensive than tall smokestacks
(Speth , 1980). The SIP standard encourages the construction
of tall stacks which allow industries to spread pollutants afar
and still meet ambient air quality standards in the local area
(Dumanoski, 1980). The. accumulation of pollutants in the
atmosphere, wind-borne and deposited as acid rain, is not
adequately addressed under the SIP concept (Speth, 1980).
Robert Rauch, an attorney for the Alliance to Save Energy,
is critical of the EPA for its almost automatic approval of
SIP relaxations. He points to two sections of the Clean Air
Act designed to prevent the significant deterioration of air
quality in downwind states that have been ignored by the
EPA. Acknowledging the criticism, an EPA official offered
that the agency hasn't the manpower necessary to define and
enforce the requirements (Dumanoski, 1980). Other critics
of the EPA point out the inconsistency of setting standards
only to grant variances.
According to its own data, the EPA estimates acid rain will
increase by 12 percent with no further SIP relaxations.
Currently, however, the EPA has 50 applications from power
and other industries requesting SIP relaxations (BWCA ,
1980). SIP relaxations are granted on a company-by-company basis. It is interesting to note that 21 of the pending
applications came from Ohio, which already produces as
much sulfur dioxide pollution as the entire Northeast and
has the highest emission allowances of any state. A number
of downwind states including Maine , Vermont, New York
and Pennsylvania have joined to protest any further relaxation of pollution limits for Ohio power plants (Dumanoski,
1980).
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) (Section 111
of the Clean Air Act) apply to new power plants only. NSPS
require utilities to remove from 70 to 90 percent of the sulfur from flue gases depending upon whether low-or highsulfur coal is burned (Likens et al., 1979). While the NSPS
will help control emissions from new plants, the greatest
amount of sulfur emissions from existing plants exempt from
the stricter controls. To illustrate the difference between
the emissions limits on old and new plants, Rauch notes that
under the current law, the Gavin power plant in· Ohio can
emit seven times more sulfur dioxide than a new plant subject to NSPS (Dumanoski, 1980). Thus, according to EPA
estimates, sulfur dioxide emissions by utilities will increase
"from 18.6 million metric tons in 1975 to between 20.5
(with conservation and the best available controls) and to
23.8 million metric tons (under existing regulations) in 1995
(Likens, 1979)."
According to Rauch, one effect of the NSPS may be to give
the utilities an incentive to extend the life cycle of their
older plants rather than investing in less polluting new facilities (Henly, 1980).
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Nitrogen-oxide emissions can be expected to increase since·
the technology for control is not as advanced as that for
sulfur removal (Speth, 1980). It is estimated that approximately 60 percent of acid rain comes from sulfur oxides and
about 40 percent from nitric oxides (West, 1980a).
Pollution Across Borders Considered

The Abatement Conference Section (Section 115 of the
Clean Air Act) addresses problems of interstate or international air pollution. This section authorizes those harmed by
pollution from interstate or international sources to seek
court relief (Berry et al., 1977). Greg Wetstbne, an-attorney
for the Environmental Law Institute, notes however, that
while the principle is established in international law, the
effects of acid rain are so difficult to isolate that litigation is
not an effective means of stopping international pollution
(Lyons, 1979).
Douglas Costle, administrator of the EPA, terms the current
law inadequate to meet the problems of acid rain. He believes a new law is needed and he pledged to push for such
legislation when the Clean Air Act became subject to reauthorization in 1981 (Dumanoski, 1980). Some features
of this proposed new legislation were intended to set controls
on a regional basis instead of state-by-state (Statts, 1979)
and to regulate the emissions of certain coal-burning plants
(Speth, 1980).
Agency Meets Resistance to Regulation

Much criticism has been levelled at the EPA for its actions
and inactions on the problem of acid rain. Rauch says,
"There is an enormous chasm between the EPA's rhetoric on
acid rain and reality." Acknowledging the criticism, sources
within EPA say the agency is caught between conflicting
pressures without a clear policy orientation (West, 1980b).
For example , if EPA imposes sanctions against the states
for air quality violations , would Congress move to amend
their impact (Heath , 1979)? Also , in light of EPA's loss
on coal conversion, what effect would an EPA denial of SIP
relaxations have vis-a-vis a presidential offer to relax air quality
standards as an inducement to burn coal instead of imported
oil. (Grover eta!., 1980)?
An obvious question arises: when the emissions from older
power plants, not subject to NSPS, present the greatest pollution threat, why aren't scrubbers required for these plants
as well? In part, the answer lies in the heavy pressure on
congress to keep regulatory costs from translating into higher
utility rates. But beyond this , Costle chairs the Regulatory
Council charged with keeping the cost of regulations from
becoming burdensome to the public by taxes. In his position,
Costle must weigh pressures from environmentalists against
those from the Council on Wage and Price Stabilization and
the Council of Economic Advisors (Science, 1979).
In times of economic recession, tensions increase between
labor and environmentalists over jobs. In Ohio, jobs of coal
miners are threatened as the utilities claim that stricter
emissions standards would force them to turn to low-sulfur
western coal as opposed to investing in the pollution control
equipment necessary to burn high-sulfur Ohio coal. Regardless of the truth or fiction or the industry's claims, few
politicials are willing to risk jobs in the name of environmental protection (Lyons, 1979).
Groups such as the NAACP and AFL-CIO have leagued
with industry in arguing that the rate at which environmental
controls proceed is a crucial consideration. They claim that
regulatory controls bring gains up to a point but cannot be
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considered cost-effective if they divert funds needed elsewhere
(Heckert, 1979).
Some factions at EPA stress the need for confirmed data
before regulatory standards can be established. From past
experience , they note that standards based on incomplete
data have been successfully challenged by industry (Berry
et al., 1977). It is hard to sell a program involving billions of
dollars based on inconclusive evidence (West, 1980b ).
Evaluating Costly Trade-offs

In a climate of economic recession , costly environmental
regulations find little support from the public , industry or
politicians. Pollution control and environmental costs of
uncontrolled emissions are both large and not easy to balance .
Douglas Castle (1979) observes: "We must do our best to
prevent inadequate concepts of 'cost' and 'benefit' based on
a deficient economics and biased in favor of resource depletion from reversing the repair work we have begun on our
global home. We can pay for that repair work now, at substantial economic cost and international inconvenience. Or
we can pay for it later--at much greater cost."
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